REESE v ELLIS, PAINTER, RATTERRE & ADAMS, LLP. Case No. 10-14366. May 1, 2012

May 1st, 2012

IZELL REESE, RAVEN REESE, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ELLIS, PAINTER, RATTERRE & ADAMS, LLP, Defendant-Appellee. 11th Circuit. Case No. 10-14366. May 1, 2012. Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (No. 1:09-cv-02435-WCO).

(Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, CARNES, Circuit Judge, and FORRESTER,* District Judge.)

(CARNES, Circuit Judge.) Izell and Raven Reese defaulted on a loan that they had secured by giving the lender a mortgage on their property. A law firm representing the lender sent the Reeses a letter and documents demanding payment of the debt and threatening to foreclose on the property if they did not pay it. The Reeses then filed a putative class action lawsuit against the law firm alleging that the communication violated the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that the law firm was not a “debt collector” under § 1692a(6) and that the letter and documents it sent were not covered by § 1692e. This is the Reeses’ appeal.

I.
The Reeses currently live on a piece of property in Roswell, Georgia, that they purchased in 2004 with the help of a $650,000 loan from Provident Funding Associates, L.P.1 To get that loan, the Reeses signed a promissory note and executed a security deed giving Provident a mortgage on their property. A few years later, the Reeses defaulted on the promissory note.

On June 3, 2009, Provident’s law firm, Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams LLP (“the Ellis law firm”), mailed the Reeses a collection or “dunning” notice, which consisted of a cover letter and three documents. The subject line of the cover letter states:

RE: Note, dated July 23, 2004, in the principal amount of $650,000.00 from Izell Reese and Raven Reese to Provident Funding Associates, L.P.

Security Deed, dated July 23, 2004, from Izell Reese and Raven Reese to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Provident Funding Associates, L.P., describing certain real property known as 4037 Thessa Cove, Roswell, Georgia.
The first paragraph of the letter describes Provident as the “Lender” and “current holder of the above-referenced Note . . . and Security Deed,” and explains that the Ellis law firm represents Provident. The letter continues:

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AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES v SCOTT. Case No: 11-civ-21976-UU. April 25, 2012

April 25th, 2012

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (AFSCME) COUNCIL 79, Plaintiff, v. RICK SCOTT, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Florida, Defendant. U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida. Case No: 11-civ-21976-UU. April 25, 2012. Ursula Ungaro, Judge.

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. D.E. 33, 35.

THE COURT has considered the Motions, the pertinent portions of the record, and is otherwise fully advised on the premises.

I. BACKGROUND
The instant motions address the constitutionality of Executive Order 11-58 (“EO”). Issued by Defendant, Governor Rick Scott (“the Governor”) on March 22, 2011, the EO directs all state agencies “within the purview of the Governor” to provide for mandatory drug testing for all “prospective new hires.” The EO also requires that the covered agencies provide for random drug testing of all existing employees such that any employee at these agencies can be tested at least quarterly. By drug testing, the Governor means exclusively urinalysis.1 Approximately 85,000 individuals, comprising 77 percent of state government personnel, work at the covered agencies. The parties have not provided figures for the typical yearly number of new hires at the covered agencies. D.E. 19-1; D.E. 36 n.2; D.E. 49 ¶16.

Plaintiff, the American Federation of State, Country, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Council 79, (“the Union”), which represents approximately 40,000 employees at the covered agencies, D.E. 34-22, contends that the EO violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches. D.E. 33. The Governor makes three arguments for why the Union’s Complaint should be dismissed as a matter of law. He argues that the Union lacks standing to challenge the EO. He claims that the EO does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Finally, he characterizes the Union’s challenge to the EO as “facial,” and contends that the Union cannot show that the EO is unconstitutional in all possible applications. D.E. 35.

The Court rules that the EO is inconsistent with controlling case law, and therefore grants the Union’s motion for the reasons herein.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party meets its burden of demonstrating that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The Supreme Court explained in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970), that when assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the court should view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

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