CHRISTOPHER LEE PRICE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. RICHARD F. ALLEN, Respondent-Appellee. 11th Circuit. Case No. 09-11716. May 10, 2012. Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (No. 03-01912-CV-LSC-JEO).

(Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.)

[Original Opinion at 23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C877a]
(PER CURIAM.) We previously issued an opinion in this case, Price v. Allen, No. 09-11716, slip op. (11th Cir. March 30, 2012). On Price’s motion for panel rehearing, we hereby vacate our earlier opinion and substitute this one in its place to more fully address Price’s claim regarding the prosecutor’s statements on future dangerousness during the penalty phase of his trial.

Christopher Lee Price appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND
Price was convicted on February 5, 1993 for the capital felony murder of William Lynn, a minister in the small town of Fayette County, Alabama, that occurred during the course of a robbery at Lynn’s home. A detailed description of the facts of this crime can be found in the Alabama state court’s decision in Price’s direct criminal appeal. See Price v. State, 725 So. 2d 1003, 1011-12 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). Price was tried and found guilty for capital murder and robbery and the jury voted ten to two to recommend a death sentence for the murder, which the state trial court followed, sentencing Price to death. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama1 and Alabama Supreme Court2 affirmed Price’s conviction and sentence, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review.3

Price commenced his state habeas court proceedings by filing a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Upon the state’s motion and after having the opportunity to amend his petition, the state habeas court dismissed Price’s petition in part and denied it in part, which the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review.

Concurrent with his request for discretionary review in the Alabama Supreme Court, Price filed in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was stayed until the conclusion of his state habeas proceedings. Upon review by the district court, Price’s federal habeas petition was denied in part and dismissed in part. We granted Price’s request for a Certificate of Appealability on the following issues:

· whether the state trial court erred in denying Price’s motion for a change of venue;

· whether Price’s counsel was ineffective in litigating a change of venue motion;

· whether the prosecution’s comments during the penalty phase about Price’s future dangerousness constituted reversible error;

· whether Price’s counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial; and

· whether the district court erred in denying Price’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s conclusions on legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Rhode v. Hall, 582 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C143a], cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3399 (2010). However, our review of a state court’s decision4 is limited by the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1218 (1996). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-03 (2000).

Under AEDPA, we accord a presumption of correctness to a state court’s factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1) (“A determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”). We therefore grant habeas relief to a petitioner challenging a state court’s factual findings only in those cases where the state court’s decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d)(2); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 528-29 (2003) [16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S459a].

AEDPA similarly constrains our review of legal questions decided on the merits in state court. Under the statute, we cannot grant habeas relief “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless:

[T]he adjudication of the claim —

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
§ 2254(d). The Supreme Court has further explained the requirements of § 2254(d) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

III. CONVICTION
Price argues that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury were violated when the state trial court denied his request for a change of venue, and that his trial counsel was ineffective in litigating his request seeking a change of venue. He argues that the circumstances of the crime, the nature of the local community, and the surrounding pre-trial publicity were sufficient to trigger a presumption of jury prejudice necessitating a change of venue. He also seeks an evidentiary hearing in federal court on these claims.

As to the denial of Price’s motion for a change of venue, we review the state appellate court’s decision on direct appeal which affirmed the trial court’s denial of this motion. We must determine whether that decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” § 2254(d).

The Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have his case decided by an impartial jury, Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961), and a defendant may request a “transfer of the proceeding to a different district . . . if extraordinary local prejudice will prevent a fair trial — a basic requirement of due process,” Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2913 (2010) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S550a] (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has stated that an impartial jury, however, is not one in which the jurors must be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved in the case. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722. “To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror’s impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” Id. at 723.

In deciding whether a defendant should have been granted a change of venue based on a presumption of juror prejudice — as Price here argues he was entitled to — , a court must consider the “totality of circumstances that [a defendant's] trial was not fundamentally fair.” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975). Most recently in Skilling, the Supreme Court explained that in each of its cases where it had overturned a conviction due to a presumption of prejudice, those “conviction[s] [had been] obtained in a trial atmosphere that [was] utterly corrupted by press coverage.” 130 S. Ct. at 2914. The Court reiterated that its decisions, however, “cannot be made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to . . . news accounts of the crime . . . alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process.” Id. (quoting Murphy, 421 U.S. at 798-99).

The Court in Skilling noted several factors that have been pertinent to its determination of whether a presumption of juror prejudice has existed in its prior decisions. First, it pointed out that its decisions have emphasized “the size and characteristics of the community in which the crime occurred” and their impact on the ability to convene an impartial venire. Id. at 2915. The Court has considered whether the associated media coverage has included a “confession or other blatantly prejudicial information of the type readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight.” Id. at 2916 (citing Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), in which a local television station broadcast, on three separate occasions just before trial, the filmed interrogation and confession of the defendant). The Court also has taken into account the length of time that has elapsed from the crime until the trial and the degree of media coverage during that time. Id.; see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032-33 (1984) (“[T]he record of publicity in the months preceding, and at the time of, the second trial does not reveal the barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial, amounting to a huge . . . wave of public passion[.]”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Upon direct review of the trial court’s denial of Price’s request for a change of venue, the state appellate court noted that Price submitted a number of newspaper articles from the Fayette County Times-Record and the Tuscaloosa News that had been published about one year before the beginning of Price’s trial. Price v. State, 725 So. 2d at 1051. The state court found that the articles were neither “inflammatory nor prejudicial” to Price and did not so saturate the community as to impact the prospective jurors, so that there was no basis to overrule the state trial court’s denial of the request for a change of venue. Id. at 1051-52.

We conclude that the state appellate court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent regarding the presumption of prejudice necessary for a change of venue. The nine news articles submitted to the state court in support of the change of venue at Price’s trial had been published within weeks of the crime, the last of which was published more than a year before Price’s trial. Price did not submit to the trial court any articles that had been published near to or during the trial, and the articles he submitted did not contain anything equivalent to a confession or blatantly prejudicial information that weighed in favor of a finding of prejudicial pre-trial publicity.5

Price next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in litigating the motion for a change of venue and requests a federal court hearing on this claim. In his Rule 32 Petition, Price alleged that although his trial counsel filed a motion for a change of venue, counsel did not seek expert assistance to investigate the saturation of the local community with accounts of the crime, did not support the motion with a legal memorandum and did not sufficiently explore the jury’s partiality during voir dire. The Rule 32 trial court denied this claim, which the state appellate court affirmed concluding that Price failed to “state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),” because he did not allege how his trial counsel was deficient or how the outcome of the trial would have been different had trial counsel performed differently.

Under Strickland v. Washington, trial counsel is ineffective when:

First, . . . counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, . . . the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To be found deficient, trial counsel’s performance must be “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. Professionally competent assistance includes a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation. Id. at 690-91. The Court has emphasized that only when counsels’ choices are made after a “thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options” are those choices “virtually unchallengeable.” Id. at 690. When, however, “strategic choices [are] made after less than complete investigation [they] are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 690-91. Thus, at bottom, “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances . . . .” Id. at 691. This means that when we assess the attorney’s decision not to investigate, we “must consider . . . whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527. To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

We cannot say that the state appellate court’s resolution of this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. Although Price argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in her litigation of the motion for a change of venue, he failed to allege or present any facts in his Rule 32 Petition in support of a finding of the presumption of prejudice that his trial counsel had not already presented at the time she argued this motion during Price’s trial. Accordingly, we are unable to conclude that Price’s trial counsel was deficient in her investigation of this motion or that any such alleged deficiency prejudiced him, and thus we cannot say that the state appellate court’s dismissal of this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.6

IV. SENTENCING
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Sentencing

Price argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights based on his trial counsel’s failure to investigate his background for mitigation evidence. Price specifically alleged in his Rule 32 Petition that his trial counsel did not conduct any background investigation even though he had numerous cousins, aunts, uncles, grandparents, friends and school teachers in the immediate vicinity who could have provided insight into his upbringing and background. He also alleged that his trial counsel failed to retain a mental health expert for purposes of exploring the impact of his upbringing on the crime, even though his trial counsel asked for and obtained $2500 from the state to retain an expert for this purpose. Price argues that the cumulation of these deficiencies in his trial counsel’s performance, along with his mother’s cursory penalty phase testimony,7 prejudiced him by leaving the jury with an incomplete, inaccurate and inadequate depiction of his personal history and the effect his upbringing had on his mental status at the time the crime occurred.

With regard to Price’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of his trial, the Rule 32 court concluded, without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, that Price “failed to state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),” which the state appellate court affirmed. Because the state court resolved this claim on a motion to dismiss, without taking evidence, we review the merits of this claim based on the record before the state appellate court, which in this case consists of the allegations in Price’s Rule 32 Petition. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S904b] and Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785 (11th Cir. 2011) [23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C110a].

The state appellate court concluded that Price’s trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to retain a mental health expert because the court-ordered psychologist, Dr. Karl Kirkland, had opined that Price was competent to stand trial and was not insane. The state appellate court explained that “a reasonable attorney could decide not to call a psychologist” and instead “allow the jury to draw its own conclusions regarding the circumstances of Price’s childhood based on Mrs. Files’s description of Price’s childhood without opening the door for the State to present the opinion of Dr. Kirkland.”

Additionally, the state appellate court found that Price had not sufficiently alleged prejudice. Price’s allegations, the court reasoned, did not show that better preparation of Files would have elicited any mitigating evidence that might have changed the trial’s outcome. The court also found that Price’s allegations did not show that contacting Price’s relatives, friends, and teachers or seeking school records would have turned up evidence sufficient to create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Price’s paternal grandmother’s testimony, in particular, would have been cumulative, the court explained, because the evidence counsel introduced at the penalty phase — Files’s testimony — already revealed that Price had suffered abuse as a child.

To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to investigate mitigation evidence, Price first must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e. that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, and second he must establish that the deficiency prejudiced him, id. at 687. Prejudice requires a showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

We need not address whether Price’s trial counsel was deficient in failing to conduct an investigation of Price’s background for mitigation evidence because we cannot say that the state appellate court’s application of Strickland’s prejudice standard was unreasonable. Price alleged in his Rule 32 Petition, and in the amendment thereto, that had his trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation of his background, the following evidence would have been available to present to the jury: His mother “would have been able to provide many details about Mr. Price’s life, upbringing, and character that were not otherwise presented to the jury and the Court, but which would have been relevant mitigation evidence.” His numerous other family members and friends would have discussed “a detailed history of dislocation, abuse and neglect that far exceeded the terse, incomplete description provided by Mrs. Files at Mr. Price’s sentencing.” They would have “testified about their love for Mr. Price and of the pride they shared in his extraordinary drawing skills.” His friends would also have described Price as a “nice kid who did not get in fights” and that he “was known to be a follower who would go along with what other people wanted to do.” His school records would have revealed that he “did well in school and was generally well-behaved in class.” Finally, Price alleged that an independent psychologist would have revealed that “the abuse and neglect Mr. Price suffered from an early age at the hands of his father and mother had a direct and specific impact on his character and personality as a young man.”

We, however, cannot say that had these allegations been before the jury that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Price’s sentencing would have been different. Although the state appellate court did not consider whether Price was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to retain a mental health expert, we cannot say, even if reviewing this claim without AEDPA’s added deference,8 that the failure prejudiced Price. On Strickland’s prejudice prong, Price has offered no more than a conclusory assertion that a mental-health expert could have testified to a connection between the abuse Price suffered as a child and his subsequent actions. See e.g. Powell v. Allen, 602 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C1672a] (finding no prejudice where petitioner failed to allege the existence of an expert report, or what, specifically that expert’s report would reveal about the petitioner’s mental status).

As to the allegations regarding the evidence that his friends, family members and school records would have revealed, we also find them to be too general and conclusory to be able say that there is a reasonable probability that this evidence would have changed the outcome of Price’s sentencing. Although he alleges that his family members would have testified to more specific instances of abuse than did his mother, he does not give any indication of their nature or number such that we could say a jury that learned about these instances would have recommended a life sentence. Likewise, we cannot say that a jury would have rendered a different sentence had it heard from Price’s friends and family of their love for him and that he was a good kid where Price’s mother already testified to essentially these same facts at Price’s sentencing hearing.9

B. Prosecution’s Future Dangerousness Argument

Price argues that the prosecution made improper statements regarding his future dangerousness during its penalty phase closing arguments in violation of Price’s Eighth Amendment and Due Process rights. The state court concluded that the prosecutor was not arguing that Price would kill again unless sentenced to death, but rather was arguing that a death sentence for Price would be a deterrent to other would-be offenders. Price v. State, 725 So. 2d at 1044.

Even assuming that the prosecution’s statements were improper, to obtain habeas relief, Price must show that “there has been a violation of due process,” which “occurs if, but only if, the improper argument rendered the sentencing stage trial fundamentally unfair.” Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1366 (11th Cir. 2001). “An improper prosecutorial argument has rendered a capital sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair if there is a reasonable probability that the argument changed the outcome, which is to say that absent the argument the defendant would not have received a death sentence.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “In determining whether arguments are sufficiently egregious to result in the denial of due process, we have considered the statements in the context of the entire proceeding, including factors such as: (1) whether the remarks were isolated, ambiguous, or unintentional; (2) whether there was a contemporaneous objection by defense counsel; (3) the trial court’s instructions; and (4) the weight of aggravating and mitigating factors.” Land v. Allen, 573 F.3d 1211, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 2009) [21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C2032a].

Considering the prosecution’s statement in the context of the overall proceedings, we do not find that it rendered the sentencing phase fundamentally unfair. Price’s trial counsel did not make any contemporaneous objection to the statement and the statement itself was isolated and also arguably made in the context of an argument for general deterrence, thereby tempering its impact. Accordingly, we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that absent the prosecution’s statement Price would not have received a death sentence, and therefore deny habeas relief on this claim.

V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief on Price’s claims regarding (1) his motion for a change of venue; (2) his trial counsel’s effectiveness in litigating the motion for a change of venue; (3) the prosecution’s statements during the penalty phase; and (4) his trial counsel’s effectiveness at the penalty phase of his trial.

AFFIRMED.

__________________

1Price v. State, 725 So. 2d 1003 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).

2Ex parte Price, 725 So. 2d 1063 (Ala. 1998).

3Price v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 1133 (1999).

4When the last state court rendering judgment affirms without explanation, we presume that it rests on the reasons given in the last reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-805 (1991); Sweet v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2006) [20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C64a]. The last reasoned decision in this case on Price’s claim regarding his motion for a change of venue was the appellate court’s decision on direct appeal and as to all other issues was the appellate court’s review of the Rule 32 trial court’s decision.

5Price argues that the state appellate court applied the wrong principle to his change of venue claim and thus its decision was necessarily “contrary to” clearly established federal law and we should therefore review this claim de novo. We disagree with Price’s argument that because the court’s analysis only addressed the impact of the newspaper articles, and did not explicitly evaluate his arguments about the local community sentiment, it necessarily applied the wrong legal principle to this claim. The state court laid out the relevant Supreme Court and state court decisions on the presumption of prejudice and there is nothing in its decision that would lead up to conclude that it did not apply the correct federal law.

6For the same reasons, we deny Price’s request for an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

7Price has also alleged that his trial counsel failed to prepare its only penalty phase witness, Price’s mother Judy Files, for testifying. His trial counsel presented no evidence in mitigation other than Files, who testified on direct examination for a total of about fifteen minutes. For the most part, Files’s testimony consisted of her non-descript and minimally detailed responses to the often leading questions posed by Price’s trial counsel. She testified that she and Price had been physically abused by Price’s father until they left him and moved to Texas. Price was subsequently physically and verbally abused by a later boyfriend of Files and then by Files’s next husband. Files also testified that Price was a polite and respectful child who did what she told him to, went to school regularly, and had a job while in high school. Price alleges that this testimony provided a starkly incomplete picture of his background, lacked any expert insight into what effect his upbringing might have had on his mental status and was presented without the benefit of a thorough background investigation. The state appellate court concluded that defense counsel adequately questioned Files and that it was a reasonable sentencing phase strategy for Price’s trial counsel to rely exclusively on the testimony of Files.

8See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005) [18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S419a] (holding that when state court addresses only deficient performance element of two-part Strickland analysis, federal court review of prejudice element is de novo).

9We note, however, that this would be a different case if Price had alleged facts showing that the undiscovered instances of abuse he suffered were more severe or pervasive than Files’s testimony suggested or had he alleged what specifically a mental health expert would have said about his mental status. Cf. Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326, 1342 (11th Cir. 2008) [21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C1103a] (finding prejudice where a post-conviction evidentiary hearing revealed numerous instances of abuse, undiscovered by trial counsel, that “paint[ed] a vastly different picture of [the petitioner's] background than that created” by the limited evidence of abuse introduced at the penalty phase of the trial); id. at 1331-34 (detailing the evidence of abuse introduced during the post-conviction proceedings). While we recognize that Price was not required to allege facts in his petition that would have been equivalent to the type of proof that one would expect in an evidentiary hearing, because our review of the state court’s resolution of his Strickland claim is limited to the record before the state court, see Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398, we are bound to review the merits of his claim given the allegations in his Rule 32 Petition, because the state court ruled on his claim without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing.

* * *

SCOTT MANSFIELD, Petitioner-Appellee, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents-Appellants. 11th Circuit. Case No. 09-12312. May 9, 2012. Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida (No. 05-01466-GAP-KRS).

(Before EDMONDSON, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.)

(MARCUS, Circuit Judge.) In this capital case, the State of Florida appeals the district court’s order granting habeas relief to petitioner Scott Mansfield on his claim that the admission at trial of a videotape of his custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers, when he never received any Miranda warnings, yielded prejudicial constitutional error. On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the admission of the videotaped interrogation was error, but concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court disagreed, determining that the Florida Supreme Court’s harmless error determination was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and that the admission of the videotape had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict.

After thorough review of the record, and having had the benefit of oral argument, we reverse the judgment of the district court. As we see it, the district court essentially engaged in its own factfinding process, failing to accept as correct (as it was obliged to do) some of the unrebutted factual findings of the Florida Supreme Court that credited significant pieces of the State’s case against Mansfield. The district court also afforded precious little weight to other pieces of evidence that the Florida Supreme Court fairly relied upon, and ignored entirely still other evidence incriminating Mansfield. Viewing the entirety of the evidence in light of the full record and according proper deference to the Florida Supreme Court’s factfinding process, we are constrained to conclude that the admission of the videotaped interrogation amounted to harmless error under the “actual prejudice” standard for collateral review set forth by the Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order granting habeas relief.

I.
Mansfield was convicted of the first degree murder of Sara Robles. The underlying facts, which we glean from the trial testimony and the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court addressing Mansfield’s direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly S245a] (“Mansfield I”), are these.

On October 15, 1995, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Sara Robles was brutally murdered. Her body was discovered later that morning, lying adjacent to a Winn-Dixie grocery store in Kissimmee, Florida. Her breasts and pelvic area had been mutilated, and further examination revealed that her nipples had been cut off, as well as portions of her labia minora, labia majora, and clitoris. Robles was found wearing a watch that was cracked and stopped at 3:00 a.m. Food stamps were strewn around her body, and a pager was found less than eight feet away. The police also found two gold chains: one by the pager, and the other on Robles’ body.

The police investigation that followed determined that Robles and a male matching Mansfield’s description had been at a nearby bar called Rosie’s Pub, located in the same shopping plaza as the Winn-Dixie, in the early morning hours on the day of the murder. The police interviewed a bartender at Rosie’s Pub, who indicated that Robles, Mansfield, and a third individual, William Finneran, left the bar shortly after 2:00 a.m. The police also interviewed Finneran, who testified at trial that he left the bar at the same time as Mansfield and Robles and that he last saw the two just outside the Winn-Dixie before they entered the store.

The police discovered that the pager found at the crime scene belonged to Mansfield. Detectives from the Kissimmee Police Department went to Mansfield’s residence on the evening of October 15 to question him. Mansfield agreed to be interviewed by the detectives at the police station. The interrogation was videotaped by the police.

The videotaped interrogation, which was played to the jury at trial over Mansfield’s objection, is at the core of this appeal. The interrogation took place on the night of October 15, 1995, the date of the murder. Once at the police station, Mansfield was interrogated by a total of three officers. It is undisputed that the officers never informed Mansfield of his Miranda rights prior to or during the interrogation. Mansfield I, 758 So. 2d at 644.

The vast majority of the approximately two-hour-long interrogation consisted of the officers asking Mansfield about where he went — and with whom — after leaving Rosie’s Pub on the morning of the murder. Mansfield initially said that he went directly home by himself, but later, after being confronted with evidence placing him at the Winn-Dixie with the victim shortly before her death, repeatedly claimed that he was drunk at the time and could not remember what had happened or where he had gone. Mansfield gave similar denials when confronted with other evidence. When the officers told Mansfield that they had found his pager (because it had been discovered near Robles’ body next to the Winn-Dixie), Mansfield claimed that he must have lost it at the bar or it must have been stolen.

The interrogation also contained a number of exchanges in which the officers accused Mansfield of committing this gruesome murder. The interrogation did not contain a confession, however. Throughout the interrogation, Mansfield consistently denied the officers’ accusations.

During the course of the interrogation, the police received further evidence placing Mansfield at the scene of the crime. Juanita Roberson, who was working at the Winn-Dixie on the morning of the murder, identified Mansfield in a photo lineup. In particular, she identified him as the man she twice saw with Robles in the early morning hours of October 15 — first inside the Winn-Dixie, and then outside of the store at approximately 3:00 a.m.

At the close of the interrogation, the police arrested Mansfield and took into evidence a ring with a “grim reaper” design that Mansfield was wearing. The next day, Mansfield’s brother Charles called the police and alerted them to items found in Mansfield’s room, which included food stamps, a knife, clothing, and a towel.

At trial, the State’s medical examiner, Dr. Julie Martin, testified that Robles died of asphyxia due to airway compression as a result of blunt force trauma to the neck. Dr. Martin opined that the murderer likely strangled Robles with one hand, while using the other hand or an object, such as Mansfield’s ring, to press down on her lower neck, causing the trachea to collapse. Dr. Martin concluded that Robles was alive but likely unconscious when parts of her genitalia were excised by a sharp object.

The jury found Mansfield guilty of first-degree murder. Mansfield I, 758 So. 2d at 642. Following the penalty phase, the jury unanimously recommended the death penalty. Id. The trial court followed the recommendation and sentenced Mansfield to death. Id. In support of the death sentence, the trial judge found two aggravating circumstances. First, the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and second, the crime occurred during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, a sexual battery. Id. The trial court found no statutory mitigators and five nonstatutory mitigators. Id. The trial court afforded very little weight to the following three mitigators: (1) the defendant displayed good conduct during trial; (2) the defendant is an alcoholic; and (3) the defendant’s mother was an alcoholic during his childhood. Id. However, the court afforded some weight to the other two mitigators: (1) the defendant had a poor upbringing and dysfunctional family; and (2) the defendant suffers from a brain injury due to head trauma and alcoholism. Id.

Mansfield filed a direct appeal of his conviction and death sentence, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction and death sentence in an opinion issued on March 30, 2000. Mansfield I, 758 So. 2d 636. After describing the videotaped interrogation, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the interrogation was erroneously admitted and should have been suppressed. Id. at 644-45. The Florida Supreme Court noted that it was “undisputed that Mansfield was not advised of his [Miranda] rights at any point prior to or during the interrogation,” and that Mansfield would not have felt free to leave during the interrogation. Id. Accordingly, Mansfield was “in custody for purposes of Miranda.” Id.

The Florida Supreme Court then concluded that the admission of the interrogation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:

“The erroneous admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda rights is subject to harmless error analysis.” Caso v. State, 524 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1988). Error is harmless if the reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986). Such is the character of the error that occurred in the instant case.

. . . In the instant case the State, in addition to the significant circumstantial evidence placing the defendant at the crime scene with the victim near the time the murder is presumed to have occurred, presented the testimony of [Christopher Randall a/k/a] Michael Johns, who recounted a jailhouse confession by Mansfield. Additionally, the testimony tended to show that the food stamps found in Mansfield’s room the day after the murder belonged to Robles. Further, the State’s medical examiner testified as to the existence of a pattern injury on Robles’ neck matching the distinctive pattern found on the ring recovered from Mansfield during his arrest.
Mansfield I, 758 So. 2d at 644-45.

Mansfield filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied. Mansfield v. Florida, 532 U.S. 998 (2001). Mansfield then sought postconviction relief in state court. The postconviction trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and then denied all relief. State v. Mansfield, No. CR95-2078 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. June 30, 2003). Mansfield appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, which also denied all relief. Mansfield v. State, 911 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly S598a] (“Mansfield II”).

Soon thereafter, Mansfield filed his federal habeas petition, raising fifteen claims, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. On February 26, 2009, the district court issued its opinion and order granting Mansfield’s petition as to Claim One (the claim that the erroneous admission of the videotaped interrogation in violation of Miranda was not harmless), and denying relief on Mansfield’s remaining fourteen claims. Mansfield v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (M.D. Fla. 2009).

The State timely appealed the district court’s order granting habeas relief on Claim One. There is no dispute at this stage that the admission of the videotaped interrogation was in error. The sole question we face is whether that error was harmless. We hold that it was.

II.
Our review of the district court’s decision to grant habeas relief is de novo. Fotopoulos v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 516 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008) [21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C399a]. Mansfield filed his federal habeas petition after the 1996 effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and AEDPA therefore governs the petition and the scope of our review. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001); Grossman v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 1325, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006) [20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C49a]. Under AEDPA, when a state court has adjudicated the petitioner’s claim on the merits, as it did in this case, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2).

In granting habeas relief, the district court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law under the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Mansfield, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1308-09. “A state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of clearly established [federal] law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Supreme Court’s holdings but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular defendant’s case.” Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1223 (11th Cir. 2011) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C2045a] (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000)).

This standard is a highly deferential one. AEDPA “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S293a] (internal quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s determination that the claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S753a] (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) [16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S135a]). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed us that an unreasonable application of law requires more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003) [17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S1a] (per curiam) (“We may not grant respondent’s habeas petition, however, if the state court simply erred in concluding that the State’s errors were harmless; rather, habeas relief is appropriate only if the [state appellate court] applied harmless-error review in an ‘objectively unreasonable’ manner.”); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”). In short, as the Supreme Court recently observed, “[i]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Supreme Court held that on direct review, a federal constitutional error is harmless only if the reviewing court is “able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. at 24. Under AEDPA’s unreasonable application prong, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), federal habeas relief may only be granted if the state court’s application of the Chapman harmless error standard on direct review was “objectively unreasonable.” Esparza, 540 U.S. at 18. For ease of exposition, we refer to this standard as the “AEDPA/Chapman” standard. See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 120 (2007) [20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S333a].

As a federal habeas court, however, we apply a different harmless error analysis than the one articulated in Chapman. On collateral review, a federal constitutional error is harmless unless there is “actual prejudice,” meaning that the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Harmlessness under the Brecht standard is a question of law that we review de novo. Vining v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 610 F3d 568, 571 (11th Cir. 2010) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C1057a] (per curiam); Prevatte v. French, 547 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2008) [21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C1195a]. “[I]n § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substantial and injurious effect’ standard set forth in Brecht, whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard set forth in Chapman.” Fry, 551 U.S. at 121-22. Because of the “[s]tates’ interest in finality,” the states’ “sovereignty over criminal matters,” and the limitation of habeas relief to those “grievously wronged,” the Supreme Court set forth in Brecht a standard that is more favorable to and “less onerous” on the state, and thus less favorable to the defendant, than the Chapman harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; accord Fry, 551 U.S. at 117. The Supreme Court emphasized in Brecht that “collateral review is different from direct review,” and, therefore, that “an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633-34.

Thus, we have at our disposal two different standards for evaluating harmless error: the AEDPA/Chapman standard and the Brecht standard. It is clear that when a state court on direct review has determined that the alleged constitutional error was harmless under Chapman, a habeas petition cannot be successful unless it satisfies both AEDPA/Chapman and Brecht. That is, for a federal court to grant habeas relief, it must be true both that the state court’s application of the Chapman harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard was objectively unreasonable and that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict. Fry, 551 U.S. at 119 (explaining that a petitioner must continue to satisfy Brecht even after the enactment of AEDPA, because AEDPA “sets forth a precondition to the grant of habeas relief . . . not an entitlement to it”). That said, as the Supreme Court recognized in Fry, “it certainly makes no sense to require formal application of both tests (AEDPA/Chapman and Brecht) when the latter obviously subsumes the former.” 551 U.S. at 120.

Similarly, a federal court may deny habeas relief based solely on a determination that the constitutional error is harmless under the Brecht standard. Because the petitioner must satisfy both tests in order to obtain habeas relief, it necessarily follows that relief may be denied on the basis of Brecht alone. Indeed, subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Fry, decisions of this Court have denied habeas relief solely under the Brecht standard, without first examining whether the state court’s harmless error determination on direct review was objectively unreasonable. See Vining, 610 F.3d at 571-74; Hodges v. Att’y Gen., State of Fla., 506 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) [21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C179a]. Although, unlike the instant case, it was not entirely clear in those cases whether the state court had conducted its harmless error analysis under the correct Chapman standard, we proceeded to deny habeas relief solely under an application of Brecht without ever engaging in the AEDPA/Chapman analysis. Vining, 610 F.3d at 571-74 & n.2.; Hodges, 506 F.3d at 1343.

We also observe that almost all of our sister circuits have concluded that a determination that an error is harmless under the Brecht standard is sufficient for the denial of habeas relief, without any examination of whether the state court’s harmless error determination under Chapman was objectively unreasonable. See Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 93-94 & n.9 (2d Cir. 2011); Bauberger v. Haynes, 632 F.3d 100, 104-05 (4th Cir. 2011); Welch v. Workman, 639 F.3d 980, 993 (10th Cir. 2011); Wesbrook v. Thaler, 585 F.3d 245, 255-56 (5th Cir. 2009); Ruelas v. Wolfenbarger, 580 F.3d 403, 411-13 (6th Cir. 2009); Jackson v. Norris, 573 F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 2009); Foxworth v. St. Amand, 570 F.3d 414, 435-36 (1st Cir. 2009); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 755 (9th Cir. 2009); Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 275-76 (3d Cir. 2008). But see Johnson v. Acevedo, 572 F.3d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 2009) (requiring a two-step analysis: first, AEDPA/Chapman, and then, if the petitioner clears the AEDPA/Chapman hurdle, Brecht).

In short, we observe, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Fry, that a federal habeas court may deny relief based solely on a determination that a federal constitutional error was harmless under the Brecht standard.

III.

A.
On appeal, the State contends that the district court erred in granting Mansfield habeas relief, having wrongfully substituted its own independent factfinding about the nature and strength of the State’s evidence against Mansfield for the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court. In particular, the State says that the district court rejected the state court’s factfinding determination by failing to assign sufficient (if any) probative value to: the jailhouse confession testimony of Christopher Randall a/k/a Michael Johns (“Randall”); the incriminating evidence, especially food stamps, found in Mansfield’s room at his brother’s apartment; the medical examiner’s testimony regarding a distinctive pattern injury on Robles’ neck that was consistent with Mansfield’s “grim reaper” ring; and the significant circumstantial evidence, including Mansfield’s pager, placing Mansfield with Robles at the scene of the crime at almost the exact time of Robles’ death.

In response, Mansfield primarily challenges the probative value of the State’s evidence against him, asserting that the State only had a weak case for conviction without the videotaped interrogation. Mansfield claims that: the testimony of Randall, who was heavily impeached at trial, was not credible in the least; the food stamps found in Mansfield’s room were “not incriminating” because the State never proved that they were issued to Robles; the pattern injury on Robles’ neck was “not incriminating” because the medical examiner only testified that the grim reaper ring could have caused the injury, not that it definitively caused the injury; Mansfield’s pager found near Robles’ body had “no evidentiary weight” because “[p]agers fall off of people all of the time”; and the identity of the murderer is uncertain because Finneran had a weak alibi and was also observed near the crime scene around the time of the murder. In short, Mansfield’s position is that, absent the videotaped interrogation, the evidence against him had precious little probative value.

Under AEDPA, however, a state court’s factual findings are presumed correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Ferrell, 640 F.3d at 1223. “Clear and convincing evidence entails proof that a claim is ‘highly probable,’ a standard requiring more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1177 (11th Cir. 2010) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C402a] (quoting United States v. Owens, 854 F.2d 432, 436 n.8 (11th Cir. 1998)). Indeed, we have noted that our review of findings of fact by the state court under § 2254(e)(1) “is even more deferential than under a clearly erroneous standard of review.” Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008) [21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C1114a] (quoting Stephens v. Hall, 407 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005) [18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C481a]), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S56a]. “Therefore, where factual findings underlie the state court’s legal ruling, our already deferential review [under AEDPA] becomes doubly so.” Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 972 (11th Cir. 2011) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C2117a] (en banc).

Viewing the evidence through the lens of AEDPA, as we must, the State has the better of the argument. Here, in connection with its harmless error determination, the Florida Supreme Court plainly made factual findings crediting four important pieces of evidence in support of Mansfield’s conviction: (1) the testimony of Randall, who recounted a very detailed jailhouse confession by Mansfield; (2) the testimony of the medical examiner that a pattern injury found on the victim’s neck “match[ed]” the distinctive pattern found on the ring recovered from Mansfield during his arrest; (3) the evidence tending to show that the food stamps found in Mansfield’s room the day after the murder belonged to the victim; and (4) the “significant circumstantial evidence placing the defendant at the crime scene with the victim near the time the murder is presumed to have occurred.” Mansfield I, 758 So. 2d at 645. In concluding that the error — admission of the videotaped interrogation — was not harmless under either AEDPA/Chapman or Brecht, the district court improperly afforded virtually no deference to the Florida Supreme Court’s reliance on the considerable body of evidence mounted against Mansfield.

1.
To begin with, the district court erred in completely rejecting the Florida Supreme Court’s credibility determination about Randall, who testified at trial that Mansfield had confessed to the murder during a time in which Mansfield and Randall shared a holding cell. Randall testified that Mansfield told him that “he cut the fucking bitch’s tits off,” and that he cut Robles’ vaginal area, but that he wasn’t concerned with getting caught because he went swimming in a nearby pool after the murder “so that the chlorine would eat the blood and get the shit out from underneath his fingernails.”

The district court considered Randall’s testimony highly suspect. The district court pointed out Randall’s extensive criminal history and “fantastic record of extracting confessions from his cell mates.” 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1290, 1305. The district court also noted that “there was no information in Mansfield’s alleged confession that was unknown to the general public by that time.” Id. at 1306.

However, the Florida Supreme Court’s finding that Randall’s testimony was credible was not rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, and the district court was plainly required to presume the correctness of that factual finding under AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Both Randall’s state felony convictions and his prolific history of extracting confessions were presented to the jury at great length during the defense’s cross-examination of Randall. Nonetheless, the jury convicted Mansfield, and the Florida Supreme Court credited Randall’s testimony as evidence contributing to Mansfield’s conviction. In addition, we can find no record support for the district court’s determination that the contents of Randall’s testimony were known to the general public at the time of Mansfield’s jailhouse confession.

Moreover, Randall’s testimony concerning Mansfield’s actions after the killing was corroborated by the testimony of Mansfield’s niece, Melissa Johnson (who lived in the apartment where Mansfield was staying), who testified that Mansfield arrived at the apartment at approximately 4:30 a.m. on the morning of Robles’ murder, that Mansfield did not have his shirt on and was carrying his shoes, that Mansfield’s entire body was wet, that Mansfield asked her for a towel, and that Mansfield had a red spot on his shorts. Although ignored entirely by the district court, this testimony corroborated the account reported by Randall at trial: that Mansfield went swimming shortly after committing the murder in order to wash off any blood or other physical evidence.

2.
The district court afforded virtually no weight to the testimony of the State’s medical examiner, Dr. Martin, notwithstanding the Florida Supreme Court’s finding crediting her testimony. In its harmless error analysis, the Florida Supreme Court said that Dr. Martin testified that the pattern injury on Robles’ neck “match[ed]” the pattern on Mansfield’s grim reaper ring. Mansfield I, 758 So. 2d at 645. This admittedly would overstate the case if we were to interpret “match” to mean a 100 percent certainty that the injury was caused by the ring, but earlier in its opinion the Florida Supreme Court accurately recounted Dr. Martin’s testimony as stating that the pattern injury was “consistent” with the pattern found on the ring. Id. at 641.

More importantly, the record strongly supports the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that Dr. Martin’s testimony was credible. On direct examination by the prosecution, and with the aid of photographic slides, Dr. Martin explained what it meant to observe a “pattern injury” and described some of the specific characteristics of the injury found on Robles’ neck:

Q That is a pattern injury; is that correct?

A Yes. I think you can appreciate that within this broad area of abrasion on the front of the neck, we are now seeing something which has a pattern to it. It’s rather elliptical, has some points here towards this apex. And then also within it, there are some characteristic lines or curves that to a forensic pathologist who deal [sic] with pattern injuries, this is recognized as a pattern of some type of object.

Q Okay. And what would be necessary to leave a pattern injury such as that for a body to reflect a pattern injury like that?

A We expect it to have some — an object that had some curve to it, an elliptical form, pretty symmetrical on the outside; these two elliptical aspects and then maybe something in the center that has some type of unusual characteristics that would create this type of a pattern.
Dr. Martin testified that, at the time she originally observed the injuries, before being presented with Mansfield’s grim reaper ring or any other particular object, “I thought perhaps a piece of jewelry, perhaps a ring or maybe a belt buckle might have a similar configuration that may have caused these injuries.”

Mansfield seizes on this line of testimony, particularly Dr. Martin’s reference to a belt buckle, to argue that the injury was not sufficiently distinctive for the ring to have much, if any, evidentiary weight. But this distorts the actual testimony. While still on direct examination, Dr. Martin testified that she was later shown Mansfield’s ring. Dr. Martin testified that “when I saw it, I thought that it could have produced the pattern injury on the neck.” The prosecutor then followed up:

Q And could you describe what similar characteristics are observable between the ring and that injury?

A Well, as you recall from the photographs, we had those two areas kind of elliptical in shape and then we have something similar to that here on the ring. And then in the center of the ring, there is a figure which could have produced the internal characteristics that you saw, that injury on the neck.
Furthermore, Dr. Martin, using scale photographs of the pattern injury, actually held the ring up to the pattern injury photographs in order to make a visual comparison before the jury — powerful testimony that was completely ignored by the district court. Again, the district court erroneously afforded virtually no significance to the Florida Supreme Court’s findings about Mansfield’s ring.

3.
The Florida Supreme Court also credited the testimony indicating that the food stamps found in Mansfield’s room belonged to Robles. Mansfield I, 758 So. 2d at 645. The police found food stamps strewn around Robles’ body at the crime scene. Id. at 640. At trial, the State introduced evidence that Robles had received $576 worth of food stamps only five days before she died. The trial evidence also showed that Mansfield was with Robles shortly before the murder inside the Winn-Dixie, where Robles made two purchases using food stamps. In addition, Mansfield’s brother, Charles Mansfield (who owned and inhabited the apartment where Mansfield was staying), testified at trial that he found food stamps in Mansfield’s room, and that he told police at the time that the food stamps did not belong to anyone in the apartment and that no one in the apartment received food stamps. In short, there was considerable circumstantial evidence tending to corroborate the Florida Supreme Court’s finding that the food stamps found in Mansfield’s room the day after the murder belonged to Robles.

To be sure, the evidence did not establish with certainty that the food stamps found in Mansfield’s room belonged to Robles. Charles Mansfield also testified that, although Mansfield did not receive food stamps from the State, he knew that Mansfield had used them in the past. In addition, Mansfield contends that food stamps are fungible, and the State acknowledged at trial that there is no system for matching a given food stamp with the person to whom it had been issued. But the Florida Supreme Court did not find that the food stamps found in Mansfield’s room definitely belonged to Robles. Rather, it found that the evidence “tended to show” that they did. This was a reasonable reading of the totality of the evidence on this issue, and the district court’s assessment that the Florida Supreme Court “overstate[d] the case” is not borne out by the record. The district court was, in short, bound to afford real deference to this state court finding of fact as well.

4.
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court credited “the significant circumstantial evidence” putting Mansfield with the victim at the scene of the crime at the time of the murder. Mansfield I, 758 So. 2d at 645. At trial, the State established that Mansfield was seen with Robles inside the Winn-Dixie a little before 3:00 a.m., while Robles made purchases using food stamps. Juanita Roberson, a cashier at the Winn-Dixie who rang up Robles’ purchases, further testified that, when she went outside the store on her break at around 3:00 a.m., she saw Mansfield and Robles standing together next to one of the side walls of the Winn-Dixie.

The State also established at trial that the time of Robles’ death was approximately 3:00 a.m. In particular, Detective Warren Shepard testified that, when law enforcement found Robles’ body, she was wearing a watch that was “non-functional” and “had been broken.” Shepard testified that “[i]t appeared to have been broken during some type of struggle and it was stopped right around 3:00.” Dr. Julie Martin, the State’s medical examiner, further supported this approximate time of death. She was asked on direct examination whether she had reached an opinion as to the time of death. She replied: “Yes. I believe [Robles] died at approximately 3:00 a.m. on the morning of October 15 . . . 1995.” Mansfield contends that Dr. Martin’s opinion “simply was not a medical opinion but rather based on the victim’s stopped watch,” but there is no record support for this claim. In fact, Dr. Martin’s testimony about the time of death went unrebutted at trial.

Additional evidence placed Mansfield with Robles at the scene. Notably, the police found Mansfield’s pager close to Robles’ body. Detective Shepard testified that the pager was found “within eight feet of the body immediately adjacent to the structure of the Winn-Dixie building.” Moreover, Shepard said that law enforcement officials found two gold chains at the scene, one in “close proximity” to the pager and the other on Robles’ body, further connecting the defendant’s pager with the nearby body.

The district court conceded that this evidence — the pager and the evidence showing that Mansfield was with Robles “just before she died” — was significant, stating that it was likely “[t]he strongest part of the case against Mansfield.” 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1311. But the district court downplayed the weight afforded this evidence by the Florida Supreme Court, noting that William Finneran, who had left the bar with Mansfield and Robles, had a “weak” alibi. Id. According to the district court, “Finneran also was in Robles’ company until just a few minutes before her death.” Id.

But the unrebutted testimony at trial was that Finneran was last with Mansfield and Robles before they entered the Winn-Dixie. The testimony did show that Finneran was still in the vicinity of the Winn-Dixie, because he made a collect phone call at around 3:15 a.m. from a nearby store. Accordingly, the State acknowledges that Finneran was “in the general vicinity near the time of the murder,” but further contends that this “does not negate the substantial evidence incriminating Mansfield rather than Finneran.”

The State is correct that Finneran’s presence in the general vicinity does not negate the considerable body of evidence incriminating Mansfield and the testimony showing that Finneran parted ways with Mansfield and Robles before the murder. The district court’s diminution of this evidence was not supported by the record. Indeed, the district court ignored entirely evidence linking Mansfield, not Finneran, to the crime scene, failing to even mention the gold chains found at the crime scene, one near Mansfield’s pager and the other on the body of the victim only a few feet away.

B.
We repeat that we are obliged to accept as correct the factual findings of the Florida Supreme Court, because they have not been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Having accepted the state court’s findings of fact, we turn finally to our de novo determination of whether the admission of the videotaped interrogation at trial “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos, 329 U.S. at 776). “To show prejudice under Brecht, there must be more than a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction or sentence.” Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1123 (11th Cir. 2010) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C839a] (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Although harmless error review is necessarily fact-specific and must be performed on a case-by-case basis, the erroneous admission of evidence is likely to be harmless under the Brecht standard where there is significant corroborating evidence, id. at 1123-24; Grossman, 466 F.3d at 1337-40, or where other evidence of guilt is overwhelming, Prevatte, 547 F.3d at 1305-06; Grossman, 466 F.3d at 1340.

The corpus of evidence against Mansfield was substantial. As we have detailed, the jury was presented with considerable evidence of Mansfield’s presence at the crime scene with Robles almost exactly contemporaneous to the killing. An eyewitness saw Mansfield and Robles together at around 3:00 a.m., just before the time of death. Mansfield’s pager was found within eight feet of Robles’ body, along with one of two gold chains, the other of which was found on Robles’ body. The jury heard Randall’s testimony that Mansfield had confessed in violent detail to the savage killing and to going swimming after the killing in order to wash off the blood. The testimony of Mansfield’s niece similarly suggested that Mansfield went swimming after the murder. The jury was presented with testimony showing that food stamps were found in Mansfield’s room in his brother’s apartment the day after the murder. The jury heard evidence that Robles had received several hundred dollars’ worth of food stamps less than a week before the murder, had food stamps on her in the grocery store just before the murder, and had used the food stamps — while accompanied by Mansfield — to make two purchases at the grocery store, and that food stamps were found strewn about Robles’ body at the crime scene. Moreover, Mansfield’s brother Charles testified that neither Mansfield nor anyone else in the apartment received food stamps. The jury also heard evidence from the State’s medical examiner that the distinctive pattern injury on Robles’ neck from where her trachea was crushed was consistent with the pattern of Mansfield’s grim reaper ring that was recovered following his arrest.

Finally, we emphasize that the videotaped interrogation was not a confession or admission of guilt by Mansfield. Cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (“A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). When confronted with the officers’ accusations, Mansfield repeatedly denied harming or murdering Robles. What the interrogation did show was Mansfield making false and inconsistent exculpatory statements as to his whereabouts after leaving a bar in the early morning hours just before the murder. For example, Mansfield first claimed that he had gone straight home after leaving Rosie’s Pub, but then claimed that he was too drunk to remember what had happened and that he might have gone to the Winn-Dixie with Robles after leaving the bar in order to buy a pack of cigarettes. And, although he claimed to be too drunk to remember what had happened, Mansfield remembered that he went swimming to “sober up a little bit” before entering the apartment. Similarly, Mansfield first claimed that he had rented his pager three or four months earlier, but when confronted with what the officers claimed was a contrary statement from an employee of the pager company, Mansfield claimed that the pager was a “loaner” because his pager “was in the shop.”

The principal substantive information revealed by the videotape — that Mansfield went to Winn-Dixie with Robles after leaving the bar and that his pager was found near Robles’ body — could not have been prejudicial because it was already well-established and fully corroborated by other evidence. See Mason, 605 F.3d at 1124; Grossman, 466 F.3d at 1338, 1340. Thus, if the admission of the video was prejudicial, the source of the prejudice must have come not from any directly inculpatory statement made by Mansfield, but rather from the jury viewing Mansfield give false or inconsistent statements to the detectives. In this respect the circumstances confronted by the Supreme Court in Brecht itself are instructive. In Brecht, the defendant testified at his trial and admitted to the charged shooting but claimed it was an accident. 507 U.S. at 638. The question before the Court was whether the state’s improper use of the defendant’s post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. Id. As in this case, the erroneous admission in Brecht was of evidence tending to suggest that the defendant lacked credibility and was attempting to falsely exculpate himself. The Supreme Court concluded that the error was harmless. Id. at 639. The Court’s conclusion was based in part on the fact that “the State’s evidence of guilt was, if not overwhelming, certainly weighty” and that “other circumstantial evidence . . . also pointed to petitioner’s guilt.” Id.

So too here. The other, properly admitted evidence against Mansfield was substantial and far more probative than the erroneously admitted interrogation. Given the entirety of the State’s evidence against Mansfield and the Florida Supreme Court’s factfinding crediting significant pieces of that evidence, we cannot say that the erroneously admitted interrogation — in which Mansfield consistently denied having committed the murder, and much of the substance of which was corroborated by other independent evidence — had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict.

In short, viewing the evidence in light of the record as a whole and accepting as correct the unrebutted factual findings of the Florida Supreme Court, we are compelled to conclude that the erroneous admission at trial of a videotape of Mansfield’s interrogation by law enforcement officers was harmless error under Brecht. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order and judgment granting habeas relief on this claim.

REVERSED.

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