PERRY v PEREZ. Case No. 11-713. January 20, 2012

January 20th, 2012

RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL., Appellants, v. SHANNON PEREZ ET AL. U.S. Supreme Court. Case No. 11-713. RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL., Appellants, v. WENDY DAVIS ET AL. Case No. 11-714. RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL., Appellants, v. SHANNON PEREZ ET AL. Case No. 11-715. January 20, 2012. Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas.

(PER CURIAM.) The 2010 census showed an enormous increase in Texas’ population, with over four million new residents. That growth required the State to redraw its electoral districts for the United States Congress, the State Senate, and the State House of Representatives, in order to comply with the Constitution’s one-person, one-vote rule. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,488, n. 2 (2003) [16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S448a]. The State also had to create new districts for the four additional congressional seats it received.

Texas is a “covered jurisdiction” under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See 79 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. §1973c(a); 28 CFR pt. 51, App. (2011). Section 5 suspends all changes to a covered jurisdiction’s election procedures, including district lines, until those changes are submitted to and approved by a three-judge United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or the Attorney General. See Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 198 (2009) [21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S965a]. This process, known as preclearance, requires the covered jurisdiction to demonstrate that its proposed change “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” § 1973c(a). This Court has been emphatic that a new electoral map cannot be used to conduct an election until it has been precleared. See, e.g., Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652 (1991).

The day after completing its new electoral plans, Texas submitted them to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for preclearance. The preclearance process remains ongoing. Texas was unsuccessful in its bid for summary judgment, and a trial is scheduled in the coming weeks. Meanwhile, various plaintiffs — appellees here — brought suit in Texas, claiming that the State’s newly enacted plans violate the United States Constitution and §2 of the Voting Rights Act.1 Appellees alleged, inter alia, that Texas’ enacted plans discriminate against Latinos and African-Americans and dilute their voting strength, notwithstanding the fact that Latinos and African-Americans accounted for three-quarters of Texas’ population growth since 2000. A three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas was convened. See 28 U.S.C. §2284. That court heard argument and held a trial with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims, but withheld judgment pending resolution of the preclearance process in the D.C. court. Cf. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 283-285 (2003) [16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S183a] (KENNEDY, J., concurring).

As Texas’ 2012 primaries approached, it became increasingly likely that the State’s newly enacted plans would not receive preclearance in time for the 2012 elections. And the State’s old district lines could not be used, because population growth had rendered them inconsistent with the Constitution’s one-person, one-vote requirement. It thus fell to the District Court in Texas to devise interim plans for the State’s 2012 primaries and elections. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-415 (1977). After receiving proposals from the parties and holding extensive hearings, that court issued its interim plans. The court unanimously agreed on an interim State Senate plan, but Judge Smith dissented with respect to the congressional and State House plans. Texas asked this Court to stay the interim plans pending an appeal, arguing that they were unnecessarily inconsistent with the State’s enacted plans. This Court granted the stay and noted probable jurisdiction. 565 U.S. __ (2011).

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MAPLES v THOMAS. Case No. 10-63. January 18, 2012

January 18th, 2012

CORY R. MAPLES, Petitioner, v. KIM T. THOMAS, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. U.S. Supreme Court. Case No. 10-63. Argued October 4, 2011-January 18, 2012. On Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

Syllabus

Petitioner Cory R. Maples was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death in Alabama state court. In 2001, Maples sought postconviction relief in state court under Alabama Rule 32. Maples alleged, among other things, that his underpaid and inexperienced trial attorneys failed to afford him the effective assistance guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. His petition was written by two pro bono attorneys, Jaasai Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz, both associated with the New York offices of the Sullivan & Cromwell law firm. As required by Alabama law, the two attorneys engaged an Alabama lawyer, John Butler, to move their admission pro hac vice. Butler made clear, however, that he would undertake no substantive involvement in the case.

In 2002, while Maples’ state postconviction petition was pending, Munanka and Ingen-Housz left Sullivan & Cromwell. Their new employment disabled them from representing Maples. They did not inform Maples of their departure and consequent inability to serve as his counsel. In disregard of Alabama law, neither sought the trial court’s leave to withdraw. No other Sullivan & Cromwell attorney entered an appearance, moved to substitute counsel, or otherwise notified the court of a change in Maples’ representation. Thus, Munanka, Ingen-Housz, and Butler remained Maples’ listed, and only, attorneys of record.

The trial court denied Maples’ petition in May 2003. Notices of the order were posted to Munanka and Ingen-Housz at Sullivan & Cromwell’s address. When those postings were returned, unopened, the trial court clerk attempted no further mailing. Butler also received a copy of the order, but did not act on it. With no attorney of record in fact acting on Maples’ behalf, the 42-day period Maples had to file a notice of appeal ran out.

About a month later, an Alabama Assistant Attorney General sent a letter directly to Maples. The letter informed Maples of the missed deadline and notified him that he had four weeks remaining to file a federal habeas petition. Maples immediately contacted his mother, who called Sullivan & Cromwell. Three Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys, through Butler, moved the trial court to reissue its order, thereby restarting the 42-day appeal period. The court denied the motion. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals then denied a writ of mandamus that would have granted Maples leave to file an out-of-time appeal, and the State Supreme Court affirmed.

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